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The Coast Guard serves as the primary agency responsible for maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) and transportation security under the Department of Homeland 
Security through the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. While 
significant investments have been made in recent years for surface and air assets along 
with increased command and control capabilities, little has been done to expand the 
PWCS mission to the underwater domain.  
This thesis examines the need for the Coast Guard to develop MDA in the 
underwater domain. This is accomplished by applying the fundamental processes from 
capability gap analysis and analysis of alternatives (AoA), as would be necessary for 
initiating the acquisition process.   
Through the gap analysis and AoA processes, the organization is able to 
determine whether an operational need truly exists, whether current or emerging 
technology is available to support a materiel solution, and whether there is the 
appropriate level of investment. Ultimately, the intent of this thesis is to determine 
whether the Coast Guard has a validated capability gap, and what opportunities exist to 
close the gap.  
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This thesis examines the Coast Guard’s role in providing maritime security as a 
primary agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). One major aspect of 
this responsibility is Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Since the DHS’s foundation 
in 2003, the Coast Guard has been chartered to establish and maintain MDA; this means 
that the Coast Guard must understand all possible global maritime domain aspects that 
could affect the safety, security, and stewardship of the nation’s waters (Department of 
Homeland Security [DHS], 2011). As the Coast Guard has actively sought to fulfill its 
MDA mission, there have been substantial investments in surface assets and command 
infrastructure, as well as networks and sensors to provide intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  
A significant area for further investigation is the ability to establish and maintain 
MDA through the underwater domain. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the Coast 
Guard’s existing capabilities to achieve MDA, perform a gap analysis between the 
current and needed capabilities, and provide the first-order analysis of the existing and 
emerging technologies available to perform underwater MDA.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In addition to the surface and air assets the Coast Guard utilizes to provide port 
security, the Coast Guard has invested extensively in developing information systems that 
assess vessel traffic for high-risk cargo or intelligence worthiness. The Coast Guard has 
also established the increased need to perform underwater security missions that “address 
criminal and terrorist threats” (Walker, 2004, p. 1). This need for expanded underwater 
capabilities has been confirmed and reiterated, and Coast Guard leadership has 
subsequently published strategy and public briefings (Branham, 2009). 
One example of the potential threat occurred on April 21, 2004, when an 
underwater improvised explosive device (IED) was found floating in Louisiana’s Lake 
Ponchartrain (Truver, 2012) In this case, a private tugboat found the IED on the surface 
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in a plastic bag. Fortunately, there were no injuries, but the case illustrates the 
vulnerability of public waterways to low-cost, high-consequence threats. The Coast 
Guard, along with its partners in Maritime Transportation Security, should consider the 
lessons learned from this case as an entry point to reassess its current capabilities and 
determine what gaps exist in meeting its security expectations. 
B. GAP ANALYSIS 
A key process to determining the capabilities needed in achieving underwater 
MDA is the performance of a gap analysis. Traditionally, a gap analysis codifies the gap 
that exists between an existing operational need and the set of current capabilities 
(Langford, Franck, Huynh, & Lewis, 2007). A gap analysis is a relatively mature process 
under the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) requirements generation process. Because 
the Coast Guard does not have a system with the same level of robustness, the DOD 
system is examined to determine a way ahead in defining the capability gap for this Coast 
Guard mission. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
From the outputs of a gap analysis, along with other concurrent processes, it is 
then necessary to perform an analysis of alternatives (AoA). This process is an early 
examination of potential solutions that may be adapted or evolved to address the 
documented capability. The AoA process is an essential step in informing the acquisition 
life cycle of a program by establishing a feasible range of options with consideration for 
affordability and effectiveness.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Coast Guard’s overarching mission is to “protect the Nation from threats 
delivered by sea” (DHS, 2011, p. 1). At this point, the pertinent question is whether the 
Coast Guard should invest in materiel solutions to provide this capability in the 
underwater domain. This thesis exercises gap analysis and AoA processes to determine 
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whether a valid requirement exists and explores potential alternatives for the Coast Guard 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review initially focuses on the governing policies for the front end 
of the acquisition process, which is when the gap analysis and the analysis of alternatives 
(AoA) occur. This is primarily encapsulated by the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM) 
(DHS, 2014) guidance, with supplemental information from additional sources. From 
there, further examination of the gap analysis process is provided, including relevant 
research for its application. A similar review is provided on the AoA process.  
B. ACQUISITION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The initial entry point into the Defense Acquisition system is a validated 
requirement in the form of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). An overview of the 
JCIDS process is provided in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Process 
Overview (from DOD, 2012) 
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1. DOD Acquisition Guidance 
The Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process is governed first by the 
requirements definition as defined through the JCIDS. Figure 1 provides an overview of 
the JCIDS process, exhibiting the development of operational needs into formal 
requirements that are turned over to the acquisition process for delivery. One of the key 
products during the JCIDS process is the ICD. Through this document, the operational 
need of the end user can be validated in order to justify the materiel development 
decision (MDD) review, which leads directly to the Materiel Solution Analysis phase 
(Defense Acquisition University [DAU], n.d.-b). 
The JCIDS process involves a holistic review of inputs generated from all 
stakeholders. These inputs include the integrated priority lists (IPLs), which are 
submitted annually by the combatant commands. This mandated submission ensures that 
field commanders have a voice in defining and prioritizing the capability gaps under 
review by the Joint Staff. The individual service branches and other DOD components 
provide additional input. The capability gap assessment (CGA) is the process by which 
capability gaps are reviewed and processed through the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) for final approval as a validated requirement. Interestingly, the results of 
the CGA process provide an equivalent role to the validated ICD and can also be used as 
an entry point to the Materiel Solution Analysis phase (DOD, 2012a). 
The Materiel Solution Analysis phase requires a full review of the requirements 
defined under the ICD and commences with the AoA process. A summary of the Materiel 
Solution Analysis phase, as prescribed in the JCIDS instruction, is as follows: 
Following the validation of an ICD in the JCIDS process and a positive 
Materiel Development Decision by the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA), the solution sponsor conducts an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
or similar study during this phase to identify the most appropriate 
option(s) to address one or more validated capability requirements and 




The DOD provides further guidance on the development of capability requirements and 
capability gaps under the JCIDS manual. In this manual, the capabilities-based 
assessment (CBA) is a primary tool for analyzing the need for further action (DOD, 
2012b). The CBA process is discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 
2. Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Guidance 
The Coast Guard’s acquisition process, under the purview of the DHS, is driven 
by the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM). Derived from the HSAM, the 
Coast Guard promulgates its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (COMDTINST 
M5000.10C; U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Figure 2 provides the framework for Coast Guard 
acquisition, starting with Project Identification throughout the product life cycle, 
concluding with the Product, Deploy, & Support phase.  
 
Figure 2.  Department of Homeland Security: Coast Guard Major Systems 
Acquisition Life Cycle Framework (from U.S. Coast Guard, 2013) 
The capability gap under the Coast Guard acquisition process is developed within 
the Project Identification phase. During this phase, a mission analysis (MA) and 
operational analysis (OA) are performed to identify and document the existing capability 
gaps. The primary purpose of the MA is the identification of capability gaps: “missions 
that support the National, DHS, and Coast Guard strategic goals and objectives” (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2013, p. 2–7). The expected output of the Project Identification phase is the 
mission analysis report (MAR), which provides the required input to conduct the Needs 
phase. 
The Needs phase, per Coast Guard acquisition guidance, provides the significant 




Table 1.   Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard Acquisition Needs 
Phase Accomplishments (from U.S. Coast Guard, 2013) 
Following the Needs phase, the Coast Guard stands up a program of record with a 
chartered project manager. This decision is parallel to the DOD’s Milestone-A decision. 
Similar to the DOD’s acquisition process, the first action following the ADE-1 phase 
under the DHS framework is to develop the AoA.  
C. GAP ANALYSIS 
A review of the Gap Analysis process provides multiple perspectives on its 
purpose and application. The JCIDS Instruction provides the following definition of a 
capability gap: 
Capability Gap (or Gap)—The inability to execute a specified course of 
action. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of 
proficiency or sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to 
replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap. (DOD, 
2012a) 
The JCIDS process provides further guidance on establishing the operational 
needs through the CBA User’s Guide (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2009). CBAs are 
conducted early in the requirements development process in order to identify  
the capabilities and operational performance criteria required to 
successfully execute missions; the shortfalls in existing weapon systems to 
deliver the capabilities and the associated operational risks; the possible 
non-materiel approaches for mitigating or eliminating the shortfall, and 




By focusing on the CBA process, the JCIDS ensures that capabilities are 
developed to fulfill only analyzed and unmet needs. The CBA’s role is elaborated as “an 
analytic basis to identify capability requirements and associated capability gaps. The 
JROC preference is to avoid unnecessary rigor and time-consuming detail in the CBA, 
and concentrate on whether to recommend action” (DOD, 2012b, p. A-4). 
1. The Capability-Based Assessment 
The CBA User’s Guide (JCS, 2009) was originally published in January 2006 
through the reforms called upon by Secretary Rumsfeld in his efforts to streamline the 
requirements system because he identified it as a broken system that “invariably continues 
to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be 
required” (JCS, 2009, p. 5). This guidance resulted in the formation of the JCIDS process 
that focused the development of operational needs in terms of the capability required.  
The most recent guidance provided in the March 2009 release of the CBA User’s 
Guide (JCS, 2009) has further refined the primary outputs of the CBA from previous 
guidance. Original versions of the guide prescribed four sequential components: the 
Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), Functional 
Solutions Analysis (FSA), and the Post-Independent Analysis (PIA). Through lessons 
learned and evolution of the CBA process, this prescriptive set of events is no longer 
required. This is in part due to the wide range of events that can drive the initiation of the 
CBA. Additionally, the JROC recognized the FSA placed the wrong priority on the CBA 
by seeking detailed solutions in advance of a fully vetted ICD. By removing the FSA and 
changing the focus of the CBA to the broader span of recommended actions, the JCIDS 
process relies more heavily on the AoA completed by the acquisition community upon 
the approval of the ICD. 
Instead, “the current thrust is to use the CBA to both identify gaps and help advise 
which particular gaps require action” (JCS, 2009, p. 9). As a result, the CBA must deliver 
a product that assesses the current issues at hand, provide an estimate of current and 
projected capabilities, and recommend actions (JCS, 2009). 
The notional CBA is organized into three major phases: study definition phase, 
needs assessment phase, and solutions recommendation phase. The study definition phase 
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involves defining the military problem, examining hypothetical scenarios, and 
determining the military objectives necessary within the scenario. The military objectives 
lead to the capabilities needed for development. It is also important to examine 
overarching strategic guidance and current doctrine because these will likely shape the 
scenarios and objectives formulated (JCS, 2009). 
During the needs assessment phase, the scenarios generated from the previous 
phase are analyzed to develop the capability gaps. Additionally, a risk analysis is 
performed to establish the magnitude of the gaps in terms of mission risk and personnel 
risk. This phase also considers non-materiel constraints that may be a limiting factor in 
achieving the military objectives. The output of the needs assessment phase is the 
documentation of the needs and an assessment of their priority relative to the existing 
functionality. It is also important that this phase does not delve into the solutions to the 
documented needs because that is a separate process reserved for the solutions 
recommendations phase (JCS, 2009). 
The solutions recommendations phase provides the recommended action(s), 
which may include materiel and non-materiel solutions. If materiel solutions are 
recommended from this phase, it is also necessary to determine whether the capability 
will be developed from an incremental improvement to legacy systems or whether the 
gap can best be approached through a transformational breakthrough in capability. The 
CBA User’s Guide (JCS, 2009) cites the introduction of radar by the British during World 
War II to greatly expand its air defense detection system. In addition to developing 
potential solutions during this phase, it is also necessary to address the feasibility of 
alternatives in terms of affordability, technical risk, and risk relative to other relevant 
strategic initiatives. The recommended actions from this phrase provide the final output 
of the CBA process and support the development of the ICD once it is determined a 
materiel solution is truly required. 
The CBA process provides a pivotal step in the JCIDS process because it codifies 
the capability gap and supports the decision-maker in taking the necessary actions to 




the key for JCIDS is to establish the high level operational capabilities 
which are required, place them in the context of overall strategic and 
operational goals, and be able to compare them to legacy capability 
solutions, if any, in order to evaluate the most appropriate path forward to 
satisfy the capability requirements and reduce or eliminate any associated 
capability gaps. (DOD, 2012b, p. A-3) 
It is through this CBA process that the capability gap is defined and, where 
necessary, the acquisition system can be entered through the approval of the ICD. 
2. Additional Aspects of Gap Analysis 
Having reviewed the relative guidance for documenting and prioritizing capability 
gaps, it is important to examine various approaches to the gap analysis based on the 
quantification of the both the gap and existing capability. One review of the gap analysis 
approach was provided in the Langford et al. (Langford, 2007) report, Gap Analysis: 
Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations. In this report the gap analysis is performed 
through development of an enterprise framework, which enables decisions through visual 
correlation of the value engineering, systems engineering, economics, acquisition, and 
operations research (Langford et al., 2007). 
The sample enterprise framework is provided in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Enterprise Framework Illustrating the Worth-to-Risk Assessment 
for Competing Products (from Langford et al., 2007) 
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Utilizing this framework requires the measurement of system capabilities in terms of the 
worth-to-risk ratio. The worth is measured as the effectiveness of a system to fulfill an 
operational capability divided by the total life-cycle investment of the system. The risk is 
measured as a function of the threat and vulnerability to the system. The threat is the set 
of harmful events that can impact the system, and the vulnerability is the probability for 
the event to result in failure (Langford et al., 2007). The enterprise framework excels in 
assessing the baseline capability against the range of future-state options with 
consideration to technical performance and operational effectiveness relative to the 
necessary investment. 
A key aspect of the gap analysis is establishing a quantifiable assessment of the 
risk created through the existence of the capability gap. This is particularly important 
when examining threats with a high degree of uncertainty, such as the asymmetric threat 
of an underwater IED in U.S. waters. In that sense, the paper Quantitative Risk-Based 
Analysis for Military Counterterrorism Systems by Kujawski and Miller (2007, p. 273) 
presents the Qualitative Probabilistic Risk Assessment Matrix (QPRAM), a tool designed 
to “assess the risk-reduction capabilities of military counterterrorism systems in terms of 
damage cost and casualty figures.”  
The QPRAM seeks to expand the Classic Safety Risk Assessment Matrix 
(CSRAM) outlined in the DOD’s Standard Practice for System Safety (MIL-STD-882D). 
The CSRAM categorizes event risks as a function of frequency and severity. The 
frequency of an event is placed in one of five categories: frequent, probable, occasional, 
remote, and improbable. The severity is broken into four categories: catastrophic, critical, 
marginal, and negligible. Based on where an event fits into each of these factors, the 
associated safety risk is determined to be high, serious, medium, or low. The CSRAM 
fails to provide a consistent result for decision-makers, as the assessment of an event 
often resulted in a wide array of subjective interpretations (Kujawski & Miller, 2007).  
The QPRAM overcomes this shortcoming by graphically representing the 
consequence of an option across the range of probable outcomes through three distinct 
data points, an expected value and the 50th and 90th percentile outcomes. Figure 5 is a 
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sample QPRAM using the case of a house fire. The origin of the graph represents the 
low-risk region. In assessing a potential system, the further it is plotted from the origin, 
the greater the risk. When developed in terrorism threats, the QPRAM enables decision-
makers with a quantified threat, allowing the selection of “robust counterterrorism 
systems” in consideration of the trade-offs for cost-effectiveness and risk reduction 
(Kujawski & Miller, 2007, p. 287). 
 
Figure 4.  Sample Qualitative Probabilistic Risk Assessment Matrix (from 
Kujawski & Miller, 2007) 
In the case of a gap analysis that results in an MDD, the ICD is delivered to the 
acquisition system and begins the Materiel Solution Analysis phase (DAU, n.d.-b). 
D. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Through the guidance provided by the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the 
purpose of the AoA is the analysis of potential alternatives for the state capability 
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requirement. The analysis weighs an alternative’s characteristics in terms of operational 
effectiveness, suitability, and affordability of each alternative. An effective AoA has a 
well-documented plan, which can be developed by following the guidance in the Air 
Force Materiel Command’s Analysis of Alternatives Handbook (Office of Aerospace 
Studies, 2008). In addition to the AoA Handbook, a recent GAO report reviewing the 
AoA process is presented in this section. 
1. Analysis of Alternatives Handbook 
The AoA Handbook (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008) provides an excellent 
framework and guidance for conducting a comprehensive analysis, which is critical in 
supporting the early acquisition process. This handbook serves to establish the AoA plan, 
conduct each phase of the analysis, and develop the final results for briefing to the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). There are three analyses performed under an AoA, 
effectiveness, cost, and risk (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
The effectiveness analysis portion is the most complex and resource-intensive 
aspect of performing the AoA. This process involves capturing the required capabilities 
from the ICD and translating them to mission tasks (MTs). Additionally, the effectiveness 
analysis process develops the establishment of measures of effectiveness (MoEs) and 
their supporting measures of performance (MoPs). Upon selecting the MTs and the 
MoEs/MoPs, the alternatives are assessed in the context of likely operational scenarios. 
The key takeaway from the effectiveness analysis is an evaluation of each alternative’s 
ability to deliver the capability to the end user. This evaluation is expressed in terms of 
the MTs and MoEs, which later facilitate the comparison of alternatives (Office of 
Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
The cost analysis is a parallel process that builds an estimate of the life-cycle cost 
(LCC) of each alternative. The LCC is broken down into the cost elements of research 
and development (R&D), investment, operation and support (O&S), and disposal cost. 
The R&D costs capture the all processes in advance of producing an alternative, 
including technology development, prototyping, and testing. It is important to capture the 
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costs of both the contractor and government’s supporting activities under R&D. The 
investment costs include the procurement of production articles and the supporting 
equipment necessary for fully delivering the capability, including training, spare parts, 
and engineering support. The O&S costs will consume the largest portion of the LCC 
because it accounts for all direct and indirect costs throughout the planned service life of 
the alternative. The elements of the O&S cost include the personnel, materials, facilities, 
and all sustaining activities. An important portion of this element is an accurate 
determination of the operational employment of the system. The final element is the 
disposal cost, which includes all costs for moving excess materiel from the service’s 
inventory. In addition to developing the LCC of each alternative to this process, the 
results must be presented with an assessment of the cost risk and uncertainty (Office of 
Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
The risk analysis provides an assessment of uncertainties associated the 
acquisition of each alternative. The analysis is often broken into the risk categories of 
technological, programmatic, and operational. The assessment of each alternative must 
consider the potential adverse events that exist in each area, along with a level of 
probability and severity of occurrence. The summation of an alternative’s risk is then 
utilized, along with the effectiveness and cost analysis, to complete the alternative 
comparisons (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
The results of these three analyses are synthesized through an alternatives 
comparison. The presentation of results aims to facilitate the decision of selecting an 
alternative for further pursuit. The results are often displayed graphically to provide 




Figure 5.  Analysis of Alternatives Sample Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
(from DAU, n.d.-a) 
A key aspect of the alternatives comparison is representing the performance of each 
alternative as well as the trade space available to obtain increased effectiveness. 
Ultimately, the AoA provides a critical process to supporting the MDA’s determination 
of whether to advance a program through the next milestone (Office of Aerospace 
Studies, 2008).  
2. Government Accountability Office Report on Analysis of Alternatives 
In September of 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released 
Report GAO-09-665, titled Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided a Robust 
Assessment of Weapon System Options. This report examined the use of AoAs to support 
the acquisition process and their effectiveness in providing decision-makers with 
adequate information for establishing a healthy program as it proceeds. The GAO (2009) 
examined 32 DOD programs to determine the impact of an AoA’s robustness and its 
relationship to a program’s success. 
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The findings of the GAO’s (2009) report uncovered two major failings of DOD’s 
execution of the AoA process. The first of these issues was the correlation between AoAs 
with a narrowly limited in-depth or breadth of analysis and resulting cost or schedule 
growth. In this instance, the GAO (2009) found that 13 of the 32 programs conducted an 
AoA too narrow in scope. Of those 13 programs, eight exhibited either cost growth of 
25% or greater, or schedule growth greater than 12 months. Another aspect of the limited 
analysis being performed was inadequate risk assessments. In the report, 12 of the AoAs 
examined had little to no risk assessment, of which seven of the programs resulted in high 
cost or schedule growth. The GAO (2009) recommended improved guidance for 
conducting AoAs to better capture the range of alternatives and establish a robust risk 
assessment process across technical, cost and schedule areas. 
The second major finding of the GAO’s (2009) report was the tendency for 
programs to enter the AoA process with a predetermined solution. Compounding this 
challenge was determining that AoAs were often schedule-driven and did not allow an 
adequate timeframe to study the alternatives in terms of performance and risks. The worst 
offender under the GAO report was the Future Combat Systems AoA. In this case, the 
AoA was completed one month after validation of operational requirements and in 
conjunction with program approval for system development, precluding “trade off 
discussions among cost, performance, and risks” (GAO, 2009, p. 21). 
The GAO (2009) did acknowledge that the AoA process must be adaptable to the 
nature of the program. For instance, a planned upgrade to an existing system does not 
require an AoA, particularly if the upgrade was planned under the original program 
intent. One example was the Navy’s Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) program, which waived 
the AoA process at the start of its next upgrade development process. The GAO (2009) 
recognized this as a successful opportunity to avoid redundant activity under an existing 
program. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a more complex acquisition program must 
place a significantly greater important on the role of the AoA in establishing a program 
that primed for success. Although this is straightforward, all too often the GAO (2009) 
found that the AoAs for complex programs were being short-circuited and devalued, and 
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therefore not fully utilized to consider tradeoffs in performance and risk for support of 
acquisition milestone decisions. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the existing guidance and literature on the performance of a gap 
analysis and AoA, this thesis now transitions to applying these principles toward an 
existing operational need. Although the literature review relied heavily on DOD 
processes, the Coast Guard’s acquisition system applies similar fundamental concepts, 
though often on a smaller scale. It is essential for Coast Guard acquisition to continuously 
leverage lessons learned from DOD acquisition and incorporate them into guidance for 






The purpose of this thesis is to provide an early look as to whether the Coast 
Guard should develop underwater maritime security capabilities to better fulfill its 
missions as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). There are two major 
phases to support this decision, beginning first with the performance of a gap analysis. 
Defining the capability gap is essential to providing an entry point into the acquisition 
process. Once the capability gap has been documented and defined, the next critical 
process is completion of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).  
B. STAKEHOLDER INPUTS 
In order to understand underwater maritime security capabilities, the pertinent 
stakeholders must define the needs and challenges that impact those capabilities. To do 
so, input from Coast Guard stakeholders, DOD partners, and industry sources was 
obtained. An additional concern, because the area of interest is public domain, is the 
considerations of impact to commercial and private interests.  
C. GAP ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The operational need for underwater maritime security will be defined in part by 
deriving the mission need from existing policy guidance, from Presidential Directives 
down to the resulting interpretations published within the DHS and U. S. Coast Guard. 
By defining the agency’s strategic goals and objectives of the agency, the expectations 
for mission performance can be established. This mission performance is then compared 
to existing capabilities to determine where open risks remain for development for 
additional capabilities. 
The current capability baseline was established through open source review of the 
Coast Guard’s organizational structure and available technical data sheets for individual 
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assets. Additional tactics and procedures were also considered, particularly in the realm 
of port security, high-value escort missions, and MDA guidance.  
D. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES  
There are several ongoing initiatives that can improve underwater domain 
awareness. The primary approach to gathering information pertaining to underwater 
threat detection has been networking with Navy stakeholders, obtaining industry 
information, and assessing current capabilities in this domain. From the information 
gathered, the fundamental AoA principles were applied to examine the existing 
technology capable of addressing the capability gap. 
The AoA for underwater port security systems was conducted by assessing 
potentially effective alternatives that met the developed requirements from the gap 
analysis. To the maximum extent practicable, cost and risk assessment is also provided. 
This information varies based on the source. Once the potential alternatives are presented, 
a comparative analysis is also conducted to examine the alternatives’ strengths and 
weaknesses, which are summarized with the final recommendations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although the approach to this thesis applies the concepts of gap analysis and 
AoA, it is assumed that a formally documented process would be required to support an 
eventual decision. Their purpose here is to frame the conversation under the contextual 
consideration for entering the acquisition process. If this operational need is brought to 




IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This following section provides a breakdown of the analysis performed and the 
results obtained. The analysis performed for this thesis includes a gap analysis of the 
Coast Guard’s existing capabilities in the realm of marine transportation security (MTS) 
and maritime domain awareness (MDA), with a particular focus on the ability to protect 
against threats in the undersea domain. 
B. WHAT IS THE CAPABILITY GAP? 
The Coast Guard has assumed a major role in the formation of the DHS. As a 
result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard’s first homeland security 
mission was delineated as ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS). PWCS entails 
the surveillance and protection of the U.S. maritime domain and the U.S. MTS (USCG 
Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations Policy [CG-DOP], n.d.). This 
overarching requirement is governed by the flow of requirements initiated with National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD-13) released on December 21, 2004 (The White House, 2004). 
1. Establishing the Operational Need 
The subject of NSPD-41/HSPD-13 (The White House, 2004) was the 
establishment of maritime security policy. Specific to this thesis, the NSPD-41/HSPD-13 
(The White House, 2004) implemented policy that led to the jointly developed National 
Strategy for Maritime Security. Additional policy actions were directed in the areas of 
MDA, MTS security, and maritime operational threat response (MOTR). In terms of 
MDA, NSPD-41/HSPD-13 (The White House, 2004, p. 5) called for an “enhanced 
capability” for the identification of threats through an integrated approach which included 
intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems. The directed actions for 
the MTS called for increased safeguards for the protection of maritime traffic, including 
commercial vessels. In regards to MOTR, this policy called for planning to achieve the 
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“prevention and detection of, and response to, the mining of U.S. ports” (The White 
House, 2004, p. 7) 
Resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13 was the publication of the National Strategy 
for Maritime Security in September 2005 (The White House, 2005). This document 
enumerated two strategic objectives relative to achieving underwater surveillance 
capabilities: the prevention of terrorist or criminal acts in the maritime domain; and the 
protection of maritime population centers, critical infrastructure, and key resources. A 
stated strategic action to achieving these objectives is maximizing domain awareness, 
including the expansion of capabilities of sensor technology and information processing 
tools that facilitate “persistent monitoring” of the maritime domain (The White House, 
2005, p.3). 
Subsequent documents developed to support the National Maritime Strategy are 
the DHS’s National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, published in October 
2005, and the DHS’s (2008) Small Vessel Security Strategy. Both of these documents 
confirm the need to prevent and detect attacks against maritime assets and resources, 
specifically identifying the threat of terrorist attack, with special note of potential use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness (DHS, 2005), open action items include increasing of coastal surveillance 
through sensor packages and improved acoustic monitoring. The Small Vessel Security 
Strategy (DHS, 2008) recognizes the asymmetric nature of a terrorist attack in the 
maritime domain, considering the vast area encompassed as the U.S.’s coastal border, the 
relatively inexpensive cost of waterborne explosives, and the freedom of movement for 
small vessels. Although this document does not specifically identify underwater threats, it 
is assumed to be a greater challenge than the small vessel threat. 
In addition to the strategic policy documents, Coast Guard leadership and 
initiatives have been identifying the need for underwater threat detection as early as 2004. 
Ric Walker of the Coast Guard’s Research and Development Center enumerated the need 
for the Coast Guard to develop an underwater port security capability. The two key areas 
of performance characteristics of this mission include protection of high value assets 
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against underwater threats and the detection, identification and response to hostile 
swimmers or divers. (Walker, 2004). RADM Steve Branham validated these capability 
needs in his 2009 briefing to the Mine Warfare Organization, specifically citing the 
sinking of a 560-ft Sri Lankan vessel by a suicide diver (Branham, 2009). The Coast 
Guard’s need for underwater MDA has most recently validated with the ongoing research 
into underwater vehicles, citing the mission need of “economical, effective, persistent 
MDA to support CG missions” (USCG R&D Center, 2014a, p. 11) Critical to success for 
the Coast Guard establishing underwater MDA, according to this project briefing, is the 
leveraging of ongoing research by U.S. Navy stakeholders, specifically the Office of 
Naval Research and Naval Underwater Warfare Center (USCG R&D Center, 2014b). 
The Navy is actively seeking solutions to perform countermine operations, 
particularly in the realm of littoral seas. Parallel to the Coast Guard’s need for underwater 
maritime security is the ability to perform mine countermeasure missions in the “very 
shallow water” and “shallow water” regions shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Mine Warfare Regions (from U.S. Navy Program Exective Office, 
Littoral and Mine Warfare, 2009) 
Currently, the Navy is in the process of recapitalizing its mine warfare 
capabilities, specifically in the form of mission modules for the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS). The ongoing programs in the area of mine countermeasures include the Remote 
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Minehunting System (RMS), AQS-20A mine-hunting sonar, and Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System (ALMDS), (Truver, 2012). These systems are reviewed later in this 
chapter under heading C. Analysis of Alternatives later in this chapter. 
2. Baseline Capabilities 
The Coast Guard currently fields 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
(MSSTs) responsible for enforcing security zones, conducting port state control 
boardings, protecting military outloads, ensuring maritime security during major events, 
augmenting shoreside security at waterfront facilities, detecting WMDs, and participating 
in port-level antiterrorism exercises with federal, state, and local agencies (CG-DOP, 
n.d.). Although the MSSTs do have dive and limited remote operated vehicle (ROV) 
assets, the capability to perform persistent monitoring across the maritime domain is not 
yet developed for underwater detection. 
3. Operating Environment 
A key attribute to be considered for providing maritime security in the underwater 
domain is the unique characteristics of ports and waterways. Traditional underwater 
surveillance is established through the use of high-power sonar systems. These systems 
are overwhelmed by reverberating noise in the littoral seas due to relatively shallow 
water depths. As a result, the ability to detect and identify potential threats by traditional 
sonar systems has previously been deemed ineffective.  
Another critical aspect of establishing underwater MDA is the vast area 
encapsulated at the United States’ maritime border. The Coast Guard’s area of 
responsibility includes 95,000 miles of coastline, 361 ports, 10,000 miles of navigable 
waterways, and an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) of 3.4 million square miles. 
Additionally, the U.S. MTS is estimated to account for $700 billion to the U.S. economy 
annually (DHS, 2008). The expanse of this jurisdiction requires decision-makers to make 




4. Operational Concepts 
Another key to delivering solutions to a capability gap is an understanding of the 
methods of employment for the potential system. In this case, it is important to determine 
operating constraints that may exist, such as duration of operations, nature of threat, and 
method of protection. For the purposes of maritime security, there are two primary 
scenarios that arise: the protection of critical infrastructure, and successful escort of high-
value vessel traffic. 
In terms of conducting operations, it is not feasible to establish a 24-hour 
surveillance system across the entire underwater domain. Because the area being 
protected is extensively public waterways, the vast majority of detected objects are non-
threatening routine vessel traffic. The nature of the threat is best defined through regular 
assessment by the intelligence community. The threat assessments performed on critical 
ports must merge real-time intelligence data with the impact assessments that have been 
conducted through the port security planning process.  
Based on the synergy of the current threat picture and the intelligence 
background, the method of protection must be adaptable to an ever-changing landscape. 
Where it is determined that critical infrastructure assets must receive continuous 
surveillance, the recommended alternative must consider an autonomous, active system. 
In the case of high-value vessels, Coast Guard vessels provide a “moving Naval Vessel 
Protection Zone” for transit through major waterways (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012, p.35). 
5. Measures of Effectiveness 
Key attributes that should be considered in determining the suitability of 
alternative solutions to fulfill the defined capability gap are suggested here.  
a. Success of Detection 
An important challenge in determining the effectiveness of potential alternatives 




b. Processing Time 
The suitability of an examined alternative will consider factors such as the ability 
to provide timely information that allows for adequate response, and minimizing of the 
threat. This MoE considers the time necessary for capturing input data, the software 
processing the data, the communications network to a command and control point, and 
the ability to discern an actionable threat. The shorter the time period for these activities, 
the greater the effectiveness. 
c. Deployability 
An assumption is made that in addition to some fixed capabilities for critical 
infrastructure, the capability for underwater threat detection must be deployable to meet 
an urgent operational demand. This is in keeping with current PWCS missions, which 
utilize the MSSTs to respond to increased operational tempo, as needed. Specific 
examples include major sporting events, political conventions, and international summits, 
such as a meeting of the G8. A measure of deployability would consider the time to 
transport and conduct operations of a given alternative. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
An AoA was performed through a review of the current technologies being 
developed in industry, along with the U.S. Navy’s program offices, and an examination 
of other government activities. The results are presented through a qualitative 
examination of the alternative’s effectiveness in the previously defined MOEs, an 
assessment of the affordability of the alternative, and then existing risks in bringing the 
alternative to implementation, is also considered. 
1. Fixed-Installation Systems 
One major functional capability for performing underwater maritime surveillance 
is the use of fixed-installation systems. These systems are installed in fixed positions and 
are capable of creating a buffer zone to provide the intruder the detection needed for 
protecting critical infrastructure from underwater attacks. 
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a. Sonardyne Sentinel 
Sonardyne is a global maritime company with core technologies in acoustic 
inertial navigation, subsea communication, and sonar imaging, to name a few. It offers a 
diverse product line for applications in maritime security, which are examined here 
(Sonardyne, n.d.). Sonardyne’s Sentinel system is a low-power sonar developed for the 
purpose of providing 360° coverage of ports and waterways. Shown in Figure 7, the 
Sentinel is a side-scan sonar.  
 
Figure 7.  Sonardyne Sentinel Operational Concept (from Sonardyne, 2014b) 
Effectiveness: The Sonardyne Sentinel’s primary performance objective is 
detecting the intrusion of unwanted underwater traffic into a secured area. This system is 
ideally designed for protecting critical infrastructure by providing a buffer zone against 
criminal or terrorist threats. Although this system is deployable by a vessel, this is a less-
than-optimal arrangement and would be limited to use for targeted searching based on 
actionable intelligence. Once operational, the system provides continuous detection 
capability. Based on discussions with Sonardyne’s Maritime Security Sale Manager, this 
system is deployable for temporary protection of critical infrastructure, as was 
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demonstrated in its utilization during the 2012 London Olympics (A. S. Wood, personal 
communication, November 28, 2014) 
Cost and Risk: Sentinel is a mature technology. However, the nature of 
employment for the Sonardyne Sentinel system would require extensive investment into 
port infrastructure. Additionally, there would be a significant level of effort to integrate 
the Sonardyne processing systems into existing command and control information 
systems. Once installed and operational, the O&S costs are estimated to be relatively low. 
The level of investment would depend on the criticality of the infrastructure being 
protected if compromised, such as a nuclear power plant or hydroelectric dam, as 
exhibited in their recent projects (Wood, 2014). 
b. Naval Underwater Warfare Center: Harbor Shield 
The Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) is currently developing the 
Harbor Shield system. Harbor Shield is intended to scan vessels entering ports for 
detection of “parasitic attachments” (U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research, n.d.).  
Effectiveness: The Harbor Shield is effective in verifying expected vessel traffic. 
It would also have the ability to detect abnormal vessel anomalies, though its 
effectiveness against subsurface threats is uncertain. This system is intended to provide 
real-time information integrated into a port’s command center. Harbor Shield is not 
intended as a deployable asset, as it is installed a designated port’s security infrastructure. 
Similar to the Sonardyne Sentinel, it would be capable of establishing a security zone 
around critical infrastructure. 
Cost and Risk: Considering the limited operational intent for the system and the 
large investment to hardware and integration, the implementation of Harbor Shield would 
require a high potential consequence to justify fielding. One example may be the harbor 
entrance to a major U.S. Naval base. This system is likely to be successful for the intent 
of critical infrastructure protection. 
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2. Vessel-Based Systems 
This section will examine available shipborne systems capable of providing 
forward looking, underwater detection of threats to vessels while in transit. The primary 
application of this capability is the performance of vessel escort missions performed in 
the protection of high value assets while transiting coastal waters. 
a. Navigational and Obstacle-Avoidance Sonar 
Sonardyne’s Navigational and Obstacle-Avoidance Sonar (NOAS) system 
provides a vessel borne system capable to providing underwater threat detection to 
vessels in transit. NOAS operates in two modes. The 2-dimensional mode provides a 
180-degree scan and a range of 1500 meters. The 3-dimensional mode offers a 90-degree 
scan for a range of 600 meters (Sonardyne, 2014a). 
 
Figure 8.  Operational Concept of General Dynamic’s Trailblazer, an 
Underwater Mine Avoidance System (from General Dynamics 
Canada, 2011) 
Effectiveness: The NOAS is would be capable of detecting floating objects at or 
below the surface. In 3-D mode, the NOAS provide a scan of the sea bottom as well. 
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NOAS’s penetrating ability for detecting buried threats is uncertain. The system can 
operate as a standalone unit or integrated into the vessel’s command and control system. 
Deployability it limited to vessel transit speeds. 
Cost and Risk: The challenge in fielding NOAS would be identifying existing 
platforms suitable for upgrade. Another option is integrating this system capability into 
future shipbuilding acquisitions. This would significantly increase the time to field this 
capability. If fielded, it is expected that a large quantity is required in order to 
compensate for the long deployability time. L3, Thales, Kongsberg, and General 
Dynamics offer similar products for vessel security, making this technology ideal for 
prototype testing. 
3. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
This section will consider the fielding of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 
to perform the stated mission of underwater maritime security. Consideration across the 
MoEs will be made for both the protection of critical infrastructure and performing high 
value escort missions. A significant limitation for any UUV is the vessel speed. These 
products typically operate at no more than 5 knots, therefore multiple vessels are required 
to quickly assess an area for a potential threat. 
a. Remote Mine Hunting System 
Lockheed Martin is currently in low rate initial production (LRIP) of the RMS in 
support of the Navy’s LCS program. The RMS is intended to provide mine 
countermeasure mission capability as one of LCS’s mission modules. The RMS is an 
autonomous system comprised of five major functional subcomponents, the remote 
minehunting vehicle (RMV), a variable depth sensor (VDS), a data link subsystem, a 
remote minehunting functional segment (RMFS), and a launch-and-recovery subsystem 
(L&RS; Bailey et al., 2010). The operational concept of these systems is provided in 
Figure 9. The Coast Guard would have the flexibility of fielding this system from a base 
in the port of interest, thereby eliminating the need for the host ship and its accompanying 




Figure 9.  Operational Concept of the Remote Minehunting System with 
AQS-20A (from Bailey et al., 2010) 
Effectiveness: The RMS is one of the leading mission modules under the Navy’s 
LCS program. It continues to achieve its program milestones, with the most recent 
success coming in the form of the Functional Integration Testing in April of 2014. The 
Navy anticipates completion of operational testing in late fiscal year (FY) 2015 (Naval 
Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2014). The RMV in combination with the VDS are 
expected to provide high resolution imaging and detection of threats in the water column 
and on the sea bottom. Processing time expects some delays as the data is collected and 
transmitted via the data link for full analysis. The Coast Guard would experience a 
simplified deployment of the RMS, particularly when operating in the continental United 
States, as the system can be transported by air or on-road shipment. This would allow a 
smaller quantity to be purchased, with deployment to the area with increased demand. 
Cost and Risk: The RMS has experienced both technical and cost setbacks during 
its early program years. The primary technical challenge was in achieving the reliability 
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and operational availability metrics required. The Navy addressed this with a Reliability 
Growth Program in 2009, which required $120 million in additional funding and a five-
year halt in production. Additionally, the per-unit cost has grown from $8.4 million in the 
original program baseline to $12.7 million as of 2009 (Bailey et al., 2010). Until the 
technical and cost risks have been alleviated, this option would present a significant cost 
burden to the Coast Guard’s austere annual investment budget. 
b. Knifefish 
The Knifefish system is an additional alternative in the UUV market. Developed 
as a mine countermeasures module for the Navy’s LCS program, Knifefish is capable of 
detection, avoidance, and identification of mine threats. The system is designed to locate 
threats on the bottom or in the water column (General Dynamics Advanced Information 
Systems [GDAIS], 2013). 
 
Figure 10.  Operational Concept of General Dynamics’ Knifefish System 
(from GDAIS, 2013) 
Effectiveness: The Knifefish system features a highly mature UUV produced by 
Bluefin Robotics. The sensor package consists of advanced sonar capabilities and is 
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provided by General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS; 2013). For the 
littoral environments considered, the Knifefish is expected to provide excellent detection 
capability. Similar to the RMS, Knifefish requires a data link to a command point for 
processing and decision-making. This system also presents simplified deployability 
options for the Coast Guard’s mission. 
Cost and Risk: Cost information was not obtained to provide quantifiable 
comparison. The Knifefish program does present a high level of flexibility, as it is based 
on Bluefin Robotics’ commercially available Bluefin-21 UUV system. As the sonar 
technology continues to mature, opportunities are likely to occur for fielding of this 
capability in Bluefin’s smaller UUVs, greatly improving affordability. In addition to 
Bluefin, there are other commercial initiatives to bring to market UUVs with similar 
detection and identification capabilities, such as Kongsberg’s Remote Environmental 
Monitoring Units (REMUS). The REMUS product line also offers a range of size and 
payload vehicles, providing scalable performance to achieve an affordable solution. 
Additionally, the OceanServer Technology Inc. provides the Iver product line of 
commercially available UUVs with side-scan technology starting with an acquisition cost 
of approximately $100,000 (OceanServer, n.d.) 
4. Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
The Navy is currently in LRIP on the ALMDS as a mission module for the LCS 
program. ALMDS is a sensor package mounted to the Navy’s MH-60S rotary wing 
aircraft. The Coast Guard also operates the MH-60S aircraft, presenting a prime 




Figure 11.  Operational Concept of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
(from Northrup Grumman, 2013) 
Effectiveness: The ALMDS is currently undergoing operational testing after being 
deployed to the Navy’s 5th fleet in August of 2014 (U. S. Navy, 2014). This is a 
significant program milestone that will provide valuable insight to the ALMDS’s 
capability for performing counter mine operations. The ALMDS is designed for detecting 
floating or near-surface mines and is therefore limited from detecting threats on or buried 
in the sea bottom. With ALMDS being integrated on the MH-60S, this system should be 
readily adaptable for operations with the Coast Guard’s MH-60S fleet (U. S. Navy, 
2014). 
Cost and Risk: The current Navy budget indicates a unit cost of the ALMDS at 
$19.86 million (U.S. Navy, 2014). At this cost level, the Coast Guard will have limited 
opportunity to procure this system. The system has significant technical risk, as it 
struggled to meet its threshold requirements for detection at certain depths and excessive 
false positive readings as recently as 2013 (GAO, 2013). In order for the Coast Guard to 
field ALMDS, further cost reduction and technical maturity are needed. 
D. SUMMARY 
To summarize the comparison of alternatives, Table 2 applies the results 
technique from the AoA Handbook (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008) to graphically 
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represent the assessment of each system against each MoE. Each system was assessed 
under each operational concept on a simple green-yellow-red scale.  
 
Table 2.   Analysis of Alternatives Results Utilizing a Green-Yellow-Red 
Assessment Scale 
The key takeaway from these results is that a single solution for establishing 
underwater MDA does not currently exist. In order to establish the persistent MDA 
desired, it is expected that a combination of assets would be fielded. In moving forward, 
the system or systems chosen for implementation should be based on a prioritized 
ranking of the MoEs. In the case of protecting critical infrastructure, the MoEs are 
prioritized in the following order: successful detection, processing time, and 
deployability. For the vessel escort mission, processing time is more important than 
successful detection, with deployability third. Processing time is more important in this 
concept due to the reduced reaction time available for a vessel in transit. In both cases, 
deployability takes a lower priority because it is assumed the capability will be fielded to 
meet planned events with advance notice. The next section will summarize the findings 
and provide recommendations for future Coast Guard investments for fielding. 
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There are many facets to achieving maritime security of the underwater domain, 
as it pertains to protecting critical infrastructure, ports and waterways, high-value assets, 
and public commerce. In order to optimize its utilization, systems providing underwater 
domain awareness must be effectively integrated with other existing capabilities. By 
performing the analysis presented, it is clear that viable alternatives exist to increase the 
Coast Guard’s capability in establishing underwater maritime domain awareness. As the 
available technologies have exhibited significant maturation, there currently exists an 
opportunity for the Coast Guard to procure and field this expanded capability.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intent of this thesis was to establish the capability gap in providing port and 
waterway security against underwater threats, along with an initial look into potential 
alternatives for closing or mitigating this gap. Further work is necessary to more fully 
codify the requirements for delivering the necessary capabilities. Primary areas for 
further development include the risk analysis and threat assessment, which provide 
guidance on the level of investment necessary to deliver the capability.  
Additionally, through further vetting of processing of threats and operational 
scenarios, an estimate of operational demand will provide a better estimate of life-cycle 
costs, particularly for procurement quantity, operations, and support.  
Ultimately, this effort should be conducted through joint effort between the U.S. 
Coast Guard along with other Department of Homeland Security stakeholders and DOD 
partners. The Navy has made significant investments and technological strides in 
developing complimentary capabilities for underwater threat detection. It is 
recommended that the Coast Guard actively leverage its DOD partners to bring 
underwater surveillance capabilities into its operational portfolio. 
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The Coast Guard continues to have a severely limited budget for future 
investments, ranging from $1.48 billion in FY13 to $1.08 billion in FY15 (U. S. Coast 
Guard, 2014). As the emerging technological solutions are fielded by DOD partners, the 
Coast Guard will benefit from learning curve improvements and maturity of the logistical 
support processes. An important aspect for further research is development of a robust 
LCC estimate for the available systems. This is essential to best shape the investment 
decision necessary when balanced against the expanded risk analysis. 
Based on the MoEs presented and the two primary missions for fielding, the 
navigation and obstacle avoidance sonar (NOAS) and unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs) present the most promise for establishing maritime domain awareness (MDA) in 
the Coast Guard’s execution of the ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS) 
mission. It is also evident that with the advancement of sonar technology, there are 
opportunities to increase the protection of critical infrastructure through fielding of fixed 
sonar systems to establish a secure zone against intrusion. 
As with any acquisition process, the early phases are critical to establishing a 
successful program in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. This includes the 
essential processes of the gap analysis and AoA. These processes serve to establish an 
essential bridge between the requirements and acquisition communities, and must be 
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